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ABSTRACT
A mechanism is proposed to protect mesh networks from Extensible Authentication
Protocol over Local Area Network (EAPOL) attacks in following ways. A Field Network
Director (FND) synchronizes a whitelist table to a mesh node periodically, allowing to the
mesh node to filter EAPOL messages based on the whitelist table. Further, a supplicant
can sign EAPOL messages with its private key, and then a relay node can filter the EAPOL
messages base on the signature.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
In FAN (Field area network: CG-Mesh and WISUN 1.0), the 802.1x EAP-TLS +
802.11i handshake is used for mesh node authentication and key generation. Figure 1
shows the handshake flows.

Figure 1
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The EAPOL message is not blocked to any supplicant node in a relay node, which
means that an EAPOL message from a malicious node could be forwarded to a border
router (BR) and radius server.

Figure 2
In Figure 2, a malicious node sends EAPOL messages to its relay node. The relay
node encapsulates the EAP message as a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) payload, and then
sends it hop-by-hop to a Connected Grid Router (CGR) and the radius server for
authentication.
A Field Area Network can be considered a Low power and Lossy Network (LLN),
since it uses narrow bandwidth transmission (e.g., data rate < ~150kbps), and wireless
channel resources can be easy exhausted by extensive EAPOL messaging from a malicious
node. The following examples present two different types of EAPOL attacks.
Type 1 EAPOL Attack: The attacker sends forged EAPOL packets with a random
source EUI64 address via different relay nodes to the BR/radius server. In this way, the
attack is difficult to prevent by a rate limit on the relay node. Figure 1 shows that the
EAPOL key message is used to trigger the authentication process.
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EAPOL Attack Type 2: The attacker forges the EAPOL Key (start EAPOL)
messages by filling different source EUI64 addresses (which are already joined in the mesh
network), and then sends them hop-by-hop to the BR/radius server or simply sends the
sniffed EAP key message. As a result, the numerous re-authentication EAPOL handshake
messages can exhaust the mesh network resources easily and cause network congestion.
This is especially so since some EAPOL handshake messages are large (e.g., with
certificates encapsulated in perhaps more than 2 Kbytes), which contributes significantly
to network congestion.

Figure 3
In Figure 3, the malicious attacker forges the EAPOL key messages (herein called
mesh EAPOL-start) with all zero PMKID, and fills them with EUI64 of Joined PAN nodes.
After the authenticator (CGR) receives the mesh EAP-start messages, the authentication
for these nodes will be triggered. As there are certificates (large messages) in some dot1x
messages, multi-pairs of dot1x authentication handshakes can exhaust the network
resources easily.
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The described novel mechanism proposes to protect mesh networks from these
types of EAPOL attacks. The mechanism differs from other proposed solutions, such as
WIFI networks which use the EAPOL-START frame to trigger Dot1x authentication, and
in Cg-Mesh/WISUN, where the EAPOLKEY frame is used to trigger dot1x authentication.
Likewise, the proposed solution described herein differs from Wireless Intrusion
Prevention System (WIPS) used to detect DoS attacks by tracking the 802.1x
authentication state transition and particular attack signatures.
In CG-Mesh network infrastructure, the Field Network Director (FND) will sync
the authorized nodes EUI64 address list to a Data Base (DB). When a node tries to join
Personal Area Network (PAN), the radius server needs to access the DB to check whether
the supplicant node is in the authorized list. If yes, the authentication is successful;
otherwise, the authentication fails.
According to one novel aspect of the proposed mechanism, the FND pushes an
authorized list to mesh nodes periodically, and a relay node can filter EAPOL traffic from
any unknown (i.e., not in the authorized list) supplicant to prevent traffic from a Type 1
EAPOL attack from propagating upward.
According to another novel aspect of the proposed mechanism, the FND inserts the
node's online status, and the node and relay node mapping status to the authorized list. The
relay node can drop the EAPOL message in the following cases to prevent the EAPOL
attack traffic from propagating upward (i.e., a Type 1 EAPOL attack and part of a Type 2
EAPOL attack):


An EAPOL message from an unknown supplicant.



An EAPOL message from a supplicant at the status of online, but the relay node
is a different node.
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Figure 4
In Figure 4, the FND syncs the authorized list (WhiteList table) to node B after it
joins the PAN, and syncs the table periodically. The whitelist table is as follows:
Node
A
B
C
D
E
F

Status
Online
Online
Online
Online
Online
Online

Authorize
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Relay Node
CGR WPAN
A
B
A
B
D

PANID
1
1
1
1
1
1

When node C receives the "forged EAPOL message with node F EUI64 address"
from the malicious node, it finds that node F is already online bind to relay node D, so then
node B drops the message directly.
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According to another novel aspect of the proposed mechanism, a supplicant signs
an EAPOL message with its private key if it has already join the PAN via same relay point,
and the relay node can verify the signature with a cached supplicant's public key to filter
Type 2 EAPOL attack traffic from a malicious node.

Figure 5
When node B receives the "forged EAP-start" from the malicious node, it finds the
supplicant meter is online in the whitelist table and that node B is the relay node for the
supplicant, but because there is no signature in the EAPOL message, it drops the EAPOL
message. In the case of a replay attack, when node B receives the "replayed EAP-start"
from the malicious node, it finds the EAPOL replay counter is an old value, and then it
drops the EAPOL message. Because the whitelist table may cost some network resource,
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optionally the FND can send the whitelist only to specific nodes (for example all IR510)
for attack traffic filtering.
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